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) 
[So F. No. 22580. In Bank. July 11, 1968.] 
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, V. G. W. THOMAS DRAYAGE & RIGGING 
COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Evidence in Aid of Interpre-
tation-Evidence of Meaning of Instrument.-The test of ad-
missibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a 
written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to 
be plain and unambiguons on its face, but whether the offered 
evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language 
of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. 
[2] Oontracts-Interpretation and E:ffect-Intention ofParties.-
The intention of the parties as expressed in the contract is the 
source of contractual rights and duties, and a court must ascer-
tain and give effect to this intention by determining what the ; 
parties meant by the words they nsed; the exclusion of rele-
vant, extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written 
instrument is justified only if it is feasible· to determine the 
meaning the parties gave to the words from the instrument 
alone. 
[S] Words and Phrases-''Word.''-A word is a symbol of thought 
but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a symbol of algebra 
or chemistry. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, 1275 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, 
11069. 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Contracts, 1120; Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 244. 
MeX. tUg. References: [1] Evidence, 1397; [2, 5] Contracts, 
1127; [3] Words and Phrases; [4] Contracts, 1146; [6] Contracts, 
1161(3); [7,10,11] Indemnity, 121; [8] Indemnity, §18; [9] 
Evidence, 1247(0.5) • 
• c..M--a 
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[4] Contracts-Interpretation and Effect-Surrounding Circum-
stances.-The meaning of a writing can only be found by inter-
pretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the 
sense in which the writer used the words; and the exclusion of 
parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because 
the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily 
lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning 
that was never intended. 
[5] Id.-Interpretation and Effect-Intention of panies.-AI-
though extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, detract 
from, or vary the terms of a written contract, these terms must 
first be determined before it can be decided whether or not 
extrinsic evidence is being offered for a prohibited purpose; 
and rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary 
consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the in-
tention of the parties, including testimony as to the circum-
stances -surrounding the making of the agreement, including 
the object, nature and subject matter of the writing, so that 
the court can place itself in the same situation in which the 
parties found themselves at the time of contracting. 
[6] Id.-Interpretation and Effect-Functions of Court-Ambigu-
ities.-If the court decides, after considering all credible evi-
dence offered to prove the intention of the parties, that the 
language of a contract, in the light of all the circumstances, 
is fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations 
contended for, extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of 
such meanings is admissible. 
[7] Indemnity-Actions-Evidence.-In an indemnitee's action 
against his indemnitor for damages for injury to plaintiff's 
property under the indemnity clause of a contract, the court 
.e.ommitted reversible error in refusing to consider extrinsic 
evidence offered by defendant to show that the indemnity 
clause in the contract was not intended to cover plaintiff's 
property, where, although that evidence was not necessary to 
show that the indemnity clause was reasonably susceptible of 
the meaning contended for by defendant, it was nevertheless 
relevant and admissible on that issue, and where, since the 
indemnity clause was reasonably susceptible of that meaning, 
the offered evidence was also admissible to prove that the 
clause had that meaning and did not cover injuries to plain-
tiff's property. 
La] Id.-Actions-Defenses.-An indemnity clause phrased in gen-
eral terms will not be interpreted to provide indemnity for 
consequences resulting from the indemnitee's own actively 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Indemnity, § 14; Am.Jur., Indemnity (1st ed 
§I5). 
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negligent acts, and if an indemnitee's own active negligencc 
is a cause of the harm, the indemnitor is relieved of liability. 
(9] Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations in Papers and Documents-
Invoices, Bills and Receipts.-Invoices, bills, and reccipts for 
repairs are hearsay and are inadmissible independently to 
provc that liability for the repairs was incurred, that payment 
was made, or that the charges were reasonable; but if a party 
testifies that he incurred or discharged a liability for repairs, 
auch documents may be admitted for the limited purpose of 
corroborating his testimony, and if the charges were paid, the 
testimony and documents are evidence that the charges were 
reasonable. 
[10] Indemnity-Actions-Evidence.-In an indemnitee's action 
against his indemnitor for damages for injury to its property 
under an indemnity clause of a contract, use of invoices for 
repairs to the damaged property to prove that the specifie 
repairs had been made was error, where no qualified witness 
was called to testify that the invoices accurately recorded the 
work done on the property, and there was no other evidence 
as to what repairs were made. 
[11] Id.-Actions-Bvidence.-An expert must base his opinion 
either on facts personally observed or on hypotheses that find 
support in the evidence; thus in an indemnitee's action against 
his indemnitor for damages for injury to its property under 
the indemnity clause of a contract, defendant's objections to 
the testimony of plaintiff's expert as to the reasonableness of 
charges for repairs to the property should have been sustained 
where the testimony was based on hearsay evidence inadmis-
sible to prove that the repairs had been made. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. William A. 0 'Brien, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for injury to property under an in-
demnity clause of a contract. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
Miller, Van Dorn, Hughes & O'Connor, Richard H. Mc-
Connell and Daniel C. Miller for Defendant and Appellant. 
Richard H. Peterson, Gilbert L. Harrick and Donald Mitch-
ell for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment for 
plaintiff in an action for damages for injury to property 
under an indemnity clause of a contract. 
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In 1960 defendant entered into a contract with plaintiff to 
furnish the labor and equipment necessary to remove and 
replace the upper metal cover of plaintiff's steam turbine. 
Defendant agreed to perform the work" at [its] own risk and 
~xpense" and to "indemnify" plaintiff "against all loss, 
damage, expense and liability resulting from ... injury to 
property, arising out of or in any way connected with the 
performance of this contract." Defendant also agreed to pro-
cure not less than $50,000 insurance to cover liability for 
injury to property. Plaintiff was to be an additional named 
insured, but the policy was to contain a cross-liability clause 
extending the coverage to plaintiff's property. 
During the work the cover fell and injured the exposed 
rotor of the turbine. Plaintiff brought this action to recover 
$25,144.51, the amount it subsequently spent on repairs. Dur-
ing the trial it dismissed a count based on negligence and 
thereafter secured judgment on the theory that the indemnity 
provision covered injury to all property regardless of owner-
ship. 
Defendant offered t{l pro¥e by admissions of plaintiff's 
"genTS. b~- defendant's ("onduct under similar eontracts 
entered iilto with plaintiff, and by other proof that in the 
indemnity clause the parties meant to cover injury to prop-
erty of third parties only and not to plaintiff's property.1 
Although the trial c.ourt observed that the language used was 
, 'the classic language for a third party indemnity provision" 
and that" one could very easily conclude that . . . its whole 
intendment is to indemnify third parties," it nevertheless 
held that the "plain language" of the agreement also 
required defendant to indemnify plaintiff for injuries to 
plaintiff's property. Having determined that the eontract had 
a plain meaning, thc court refused to admit any extrinsic 
evidence that would contradict its interpretation. 
When ,he court interprets a contract on this basis, it deter-
lAlthough this offer of proof might ordinarily be regarded as too 
general to provide a ground for appeal (Evid. Code, § 354, 8ubd. (a); 
Beneficial etc. Ins. Co. v. Kurt llitke 4' Co. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 517, 522 
1297 P.2d 428]; Stickclv. Sun Diego Elec. By. Co. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 157, 
162·164 [19" P.2d 416]; Douillard v. Woodd (1942) 20 Cal.2d 665, 670 
1128 P.2d 6]), since the conrt repeatedly ruled that it would not admit 
(lxtrillsic evidence to iuterpret the contract and sustained objections to 
all questiolls seeking to elicit snch eviilcnce, no formal offer· ot proof 
was required. (I<Jvid. Code, § 354, subd. (b); Beneficial etc. In8. Co. v. 
Ktlrt Ilitke <t Co., supra, 46 Cal.2tl 517, 522; E~tatc of Kearns (1950) 
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mines the meaning of the instrument in accordance with the 
00. • • extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic educa-
tion and experience." (3 Corbin on Contracts (1960 ed.) 
[1964 Supp. § 579, p. 225, fn. 56].) The exclusion of testi-
mony that might contradict the linguistic background of the 
judge reflects a judicial belief in the possibility of perfect 
verbal expression. (9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 
§ 2461, p. 187.) This belief is a remnant of a primitive faith 
in the inherent potency2 and inherent meaning of words.3 
[1] The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to 
explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it 
appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, 
but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a mean-
ing to which the language of the instrument is reasonably 
susceptible. (Oontinental Baking 00. v. 1(atz (1968) 68 Cal. 
;2d 512, 520-521 [67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889]; Par-
~om v. Bristol Development 00. (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 861, 865 [44 
pal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839] ; Hulse v. Juillard Fancy Foods 
'Po. (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 571. 573 [39 Cal.Rptr. 529. 394 P.2d 
651; Xti/ziger \". Hulman /1964. 61 Ca1.2d 526. 52B [39 Cal . 
. Bptr. 3S!. 393 P.2d 690J ; C{J(1~t Balik \". JIind€rlwut ':1964. 
61 Cal.2d 311, 315 [3S CalRptr. 505. 392 P.2d 2051; Jl1£oacn 
v. Schultz (1962) 58 Cal.2d 858, 860 [27 Cal. Rptr. 160, 377 
P.2d 272]; Reid v. Overla'nd Machi'ned Products (1961) 55 
Cal.2d 203, 210 [10 Cal.Rptr. 819,359 P.2d 251].) 
A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning 
of a written instrument to its four-corners merely because it 
seems to the court to be clear and unambiguous, would either 
deny the relevance of the intention of the parties or presup-
pose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language 
has not attained. 
IIE.g., 00 The elaborate system of taboo and verbal prohibitions in 
primitive groups; the ancient Egyptian myth of Khern, the apotheosis 
of the words, and of Thoth, the Scribe of Truth, the Giver of Words and 
Script, the Master of Incantations; the avoidance of the name of God 
in Brahmanism, Judaism and Islam; totemistic and protective namcs in 
mediaeval Turkish aud Fillno-Ugrian languages; the misplaced verbal 
scruples of the • PrecieuseB '; tIle Swedish peasant custom of curing sick 
cattle smitten by witchcraft, by making them swallow a page torn out 
of the psalter and put in dough. . . .' from Ullman, The Principles of 
Semantics (1963 ed.) 43. (See also Ogden and Richards, The Meaning 
of Meaning (rev. ed. 1956) pp. 24-47.) 
So 0 0 Rerum enim vocabula immutabilia sunt, homines mutabilia,'" 
(Words are unchangeable, men changeable) from Dig. XXXIII, 10, 7, 
I 2, de sup. Zeg. as quoted in 9 Wigmore on Evidence, op. cit. supra, 
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Some courts have exprcsscd the opinion that contractual 
obligations are created by the mere use of certain words, 
wl\rtlier or not there was any intention to incur such obliga-
tions.4 Under this view, contractual obligations flow, not from 
the intention of the parties but from the fact that they used 
certain magic words. Evidence of the parties' intention there-
fore be,comes irrelevant. 
[2] In this state, however, the intention of the parties as 
expressed in the contract is the source of contractual rights 
and duties.1i A court must ascertain and give effect to this in-
tention by determining what the parties meant by the words 
they used. Accordingly, the exclusion of relevant, extrinsic, evi-
ilence to explain the meaning of a written instrument could be 
justified only if it were feasible to determine the meaning the 
parties gave to the words from the instrument alone. 
If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be 
p()ssibleto discover contractual intention in the words them-
selvcs and in the manner in which they were arranged. 
Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents. 
[3] "A word is: a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary 
and fixed meaning like a symbol of algebra or chemistry, 
•.. " (Pearson v. State Social Welfare Board (1960) 54 Cal. 
2-d 184, 195 [5 Cal.Rptr. 553, 353 P.2d 33].) The meaning of 
particular words or groups of words varies with the ". . . 
verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes 
in view of the linguistic education and experience of their 
USPl'S and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges). 
. . . A word has no meaning apart from these factors; much 
less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning." 
(Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence 
Rule (1965) 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187.) [4] Accordingly, 
the meaning of a writing " ... can only be found by inter-
4" A contraet has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, 
or in,dividual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached 
by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, 
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent." (Hotchkiss 
v. National City Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1911) 200 F. 287, 293. 
See also C. H. Pope tf Co. v. Bibb Mfg. Co. (2d Cir. 1923) 290 F. 586, 
587; see 4 Williston on Contracts (3d ed. 1961) § 612, pp. 577·578, § 613, 
p.583.) 
5" A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual 
intcntion of the parties as it existed at thc time of contracting, so far as 
the same is ascertainable and lawful." (Civ. Code, § 1636; see also Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1859; Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co. 
(1942) 20 Cu1.2d 751, 760 P28 P.2d 665]; Lemm v. Stillwater Land tf 
Cattle Co. (1933) 217 Cal. 474, 480 [19 P.2d 785].) 
) 
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pretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the 
sense in which the writer used the words. The exclusion of 
parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because 
the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily 
lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning 
that was never intended. [Citations omitted.]" (Universal 
Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., S1lpra, 20 Ca1.2d 751, 
776 (concurring opinion) ; see also, e.g., Garden State Plaza 
Oorp. v. S. S. Kresge 00. (1963) 78 N.J. Super. 485 [189 A.2d 
448,454] ; Hurst v. W. J. Lake &7 Co. (1932) 141 Ore. 306, 310 
[16 P.2d 627, 629, 89 A.L.R. 1222]; 3 Corbin on Contracts 
(1960 ed.) § 579, pp. 412-431; Ogden and Richards, The 
Meaning of Meaning, op.cit supra 15; Ullmann, The Princi-
. pIes of Semantics, supra, 61; McBaine, The Rule Against Dis-
turbing Plain Meaning of Writings (1943) 31 Cal.L.Rev. 
145.) 
[6] Although extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add 
to, detract from, or vary the terms of a written contract, these 
terIns must first be detertitined before it can be decided 
whether or not extrinsic evidence is being offered for a pro-
hibited purpose. The fact that the terms of an instrument 
appear clear to a judge does not preclude the possibility that 
the parties chose the language of the instrument to express 
different terms. That possibility is not limited to contracts 
whose terms have acquired a particular meaning by trade 
usage,6 but exists whenever the parties' understanding of the 
words used may have differed from the judge's understand-
ing. 
Accordingly, rational interpretation requires at least a pre-
liminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to 
6Extrinsic evidence of trade usage or custom has been admitted to 
show that the term "United Kingdom" in a motion picture distribution 
contract included Ireland (Ermolieff v. B.K.O. Badio Pictures, Inc. 
(1942) 19 Cal.2d 543, 549·552 [122 P.2d 3]); that the word II ton" in 
a lease meant a long ton or 2,240 pounds and not the statutory tOll of 
2,000 pounds (Higgins v. California Petroleum etc. Co. (1898) 120 
Cal. 629, 630·632 [52 P. 1080]); that the word" stubble" in a lease 
included not only stumps left in the ground but everything "left on the 
ground after the harvest time" (Callahan v. Stanle'j, (1881) 57 Cal. 
476, 477·479); that the term "north" in a contract dividing mining 
claims indicated a boundary line running along the " magnetic and not 
the true meridian" (Jenny Lind Co. v. Bower (1858) 11 Cal. 194, 197· 
199) and that a form contract for purchase and sale was actually an 
agency contract. (Body-Steffner Co. v. FloWl Products (1944) 63 Cal. 
App.2d 555, 558·562 [147 P.2d 84]). See also Code Civ. Proc., § 1861; 
Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1228; Note (1942) 30 Cal.L.Rev. 679.) 
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prove the intention of the parties.7 (Civ. Code, § 1647; Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1860; see also 9 Wigmore on Evidence, op. cit. 
supra, § 2470, fn. 11, p. 227.) Such evidence includes testi-
mony as to the" circumstances surrounding the making of the 
agreement . . . including the object, nature and subject mat-
ter of the writing ... " so that the court can "place itself in 
the same situation in which the parties found themselves at 
the time of contracting." (Universal Sales Corp. v. Califor-
nia Press Mfg. Co., supra, 20 Ca1.2d 751, 761; Lemm v. Still-
water Land 47 Cattle Co., supra, 217 Cal. 474, 480-481.) [6] If 
the court decides, after considering this evidence, that the 
language of a contract, in the light of all the circumstances, 
"is fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations 
contended for ... " (Balfour v. Fresno C. 47 I. Co. (1895) 
109 Cal. 221, 225 [41 P. 876]; see also, Hulse v. Juillard 
Fancy Foods 00., supra, 61 Ca1.2d 571, 573; Nofziger v. Hol-
man, supra, 61 Ca1.2d 526, 528; Reid v. Overland Machined 
Products, S1tpra, 55 Ca1.2d 203, 210; Barham v. Barham 
(1949) 33 Cal.2d 416, 422-423 [202 P.2d 289] ; Kenney v. Los 
Feliz Investment Co. (1932) 121 Cal.App. 378, 386-387 [9 
P.2d 225]), extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of such 
meanings is admissible. 8 
[7] In the present case the court erroneously refused to 
consider extrinsic evidence offered to show that the indemnity 
clause in the contract was not intended to cover injuries to 
plaintiff's property. Although that evidence was not neces-
sary to show that the indemnity clause was reasonably sus-
ceptible of the meaning contended for by defendant, it was 
nevertheless relevant and admissible on that issue. Moreover, 
since that clause was reasonably susceptible of that meaning, 
7When objection is made to any particular item of evidence offered 
to prove the intention of the parties, the trial court may not yet be in a 
pQl'ition to detennine whether in the light of all of the offered evidence. 
tlu! item objected to will turn out to be admissible as tending to prove a 
meaning of which the language of the instrument is reasonably BUS· 
eeptible or inadmissible as tending to prove a meaning of which the 
language is not reasonably susceptible. In such ease the court may admit 
the evidence conditionally by either reserving its ruling on the ohjection 
or by admitting the evidence subject to a motion to strike. (See Evid. 
Code, § 403.) 
8Extrinsic evidence has often been admitted in such eases on the 
stated ground that the contract was ambiguous (e.g., Universal Sale8 
Corp. v. California Pre8S Mfg. Co., supra, 20 Ca1.2d 751, 761). This 
statement of the rule is harmless if it is kept in mind that the ambiguity 
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the offered evidence was also admissible to prove that the 
clause had that meaning and did not cover injuries to plain-
tiff's property.9 Accordingly, the judgment must bc reversed. 
[8] Two questions remain that may arise on retrial. On 
the theory that the indemnity clause covered plaintiff's prop-
erty, the trial court instructed the jury that plaintiff was 
entitled to recover unless all of ". . . the following conditions 
[were found] to exist: 
"1. That Pacific Gas and Electric Company continued to 
9The court's exclusion of extrinsic evidence in this case would be error 
even under a rule that excluded such evidence when the instrument 
appeared to the court to be clear and unambiguous on its face. The 
controversy centers on the meaning of tbe word "indemnify ~, and the 
pbrase "all loss, damage, expense and liability." The trial court's 
recognition of the language as typical of a tbird party indemnity clause 
and the double sense in which the word" indemnify" is used in statute8 
and defined in dictionaries demonstrate the existence of an ambiguity. 
(Compare Civ. Code, § 2772, "Indemnity is a contract by wbicb one 
engages to save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of one 
of the parties, or of some otber person," with Civ. Code, § 2527, "Insur-
ance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against 
loss, damage, or liability, arising from an unknown ,or contingent 
event." Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) defines "indemnity" 
as "A collateral contract or assurance, by which one person engages to 
secure another against an anticipated loss or to prevent bim from being 
damnified by the legal consequences of an act or forbearance on the part 
of one of tbe parties or of some tbird person." Stroud's Judicial Die: 
tionary (2d ed. 1903) defines it as a "Contract ... to indemnify 
against a liability .•.. " One of tbe defiuitions given to "indemnify" 
by Webster's Tbird New International Dict. (1961 ed.) is "to exempt 
from incurred liabilities.") 
Plaintiff's assertion that the use of the word "all" to modify "loss, 
damage, expense and liability" dictates an all inclusive interpretation 
is not persuasive. If the word "indemnify" encompasses only tbird-
party claims, the word "all" simply refers to all such claims. The use 
of the words "loss," "damage," and "expense" in addition to the 
word "liability" is likeWise inconelnsive. Tbese words do not imply an 
agreement to reimburse for injury to an indemnitee's property since 
they are commonly inset"ted in tbird-party indemnity clauses, to enable 
an indemnitee who settles a claim to recover from bis indemnitor with-
out proving his liability. (Carpenter Paper Co. v. Kellogg (1952) 114 
. Cal.App.2d 640, 651 [251 P.2d 40]. Civ. Code, § 2778, provides: 
"1. Upon an indemnity against liability ... the person indemnified is 
entitled to recover upon becoming liable; :l. Upon an indemnity against 
claims, or demands, or damages, or costs . . . the person indemnified is 
not entitled to recover without payment thel"eof; ... ") 
The provision that defendant perfonn tbe work "at his own risk and 
expense" and tbe provisions relating to insurance are equally inconclu· 
sive. By agreeing to work at its own risk defendant may have released 
plaintiff from liability for any injuries to defendant's property arising 
out of the contract's performance, but this provision did not necessarily 
make defendant an insurer against injuries to plaintiff's property. Dc-
fendant's agreement to proeure liability insuranee to cover damages to 
plaintiff's property does not indicate whether the insurance was to cover 
all injuries or only injuries caused hy defendant's negligence. 
) 
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maintain independent operation on the premises whereon the 
installation of the cover was in progress j 
"2. That the damage to the turbine was unrelated to the 
Defendant G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, 
Inc. 's performance j 
"3. That the plaintifI was guilty of active, affirmative neg-
ligence j and 
"4. That such active negligence related to a matter over 
which the plaintifI exercised exclusive control. " 
The instruction was based on certain guidelines discussed 
in Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Oorp. (1964) 62 Ca1.2d 
40, 45-46 [41 Cal.Rptr. 73, 396 P.2d 377] j Harvey Machine 
00. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 445, 448 [6 
Cal.Rpt.r. 284, 353 P.2d 924] j and Safeway Stores, Inc. v. 
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. 00. (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 99, 
112-113 [20 Cal.Rptr. 820]. Those cases do not hold, however, 
that all four conditions specified in the instruction must exist 
for the indemnitor to be relieved of liability. It is sufficient if 
the indemnitee's own active negligence is a cause of the harm. i 
As stated in Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Ca1.2d 951, 952 [59! 
Cal.Rptr. 809, 429 P.2d 129], "An indemnity clause phrased' 
in general terms will not be interpreted . . . to provide 
indemnity for consequences resulting from the indemnitee's 
own actively negligent acts." 
To prove the amount of damages sustained, plaintifI pre-
sent.ed invoices received from Ingersoll-Rand, the manufac-
turer and repairer of the turbine, the drafts by which plain-
tiff had remitted payment, and testimony that payment had 
been made. Defendant objected to the introduction of the 
invoices on the ground thl1t they were hearsay. Subsequently, 
plaintifI called a mechanical engineer who qualified as an 
j expert witness on the repair of turbines. On the basis of pho-
tographs of the damage after the accident, he testified that to 
repair the turbine it was reasonable and necessary to disman-
tle it completely, magnaflux all parts, replace all blades in 
wheels that had been damaged, reassemble the rotor, balance 
it, "indicate" it and centrifugate it. Similar repairs were 
listed in the invoices, and over objection the witness was 
allowed to testify that the amounts charged therefor were 
reasonable. 
[9] Since invoices, bills, and receipts for repairs are hear-
say, they are inadmissible independently to prove that liabil-
ity for the repairs was incurred, that payment was made, or 
I 
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that the charges were reasonable. (Plonley v. Reser (1960) 
178 Cal.App.2d Supp. 935, 937-939 [3 Cal.Rptr. 551, 80 A.L.R 
2d 911] ; Menefee v. Raisch Improvement Co. (1926) 78 Cal. 
App. 785, 789 [248 P. 1031].) If, however, a party testifies 
that he incurred or discharged a liability for repairs, any of 
these documents may be admitted for the limited purpose of 
corroborating his testimony (Bushnell v. Bushnell (1925) 103 
Conn. 583 [131 A. 432, 436, 44 A.L.R. 788]; Cain v. Mead 
(1896) 66 Minn. 195 I68 N.W. 840, 841]), and if the charges 
were paid, the testimony and documents are evidence that the 
charges were reasonable. (Dewhirst v. Leopold (1924) 194 
Cal. 424, 433 [229 P. 30J; Smith v. Hill (1965) 237 Cal.App. 
2d 374, 388 [47 Cal.Rptr. 49] ; Meier v. Paul X. Smith Corp. 
(1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 207, 222 [22 Cal. Rptr. 758] ; Malinson 
v. Black (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 375, 379 [188 P.2d 788]; 
Laubscher v. Blake (1935) 7 Cal.App.2d376, 383 [46 P.2d 
836]. See also Gimbel v. Laramie (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 77, 
81 [5 Cal.Rptr. 88].) Since there was testimony in the present 
case that the invoices had been paid, the trial court did not 
err in admitting them. 
[10] The individual items on the invoices, however, were 
read, not to corroborate payment or the reasonableness of the 
charges, but to prove that these specific repairs had actually 
been made. No qualified witness was called to testify that the 
invoices accurately recorded the work done by Ingersoll-Rand, 
and there was no other evidence as to what repairs were made. 
This use of the invoices was error. (California Steel Build-
ings, Inc. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 
749, 759 [51 Cal.Rptr. 797]. Accord, Bushnell v. Bushnell, 
supra, 103 Conn. 583 [131 A. 432, 436]; Ferraro v. Public 
Service Ry. Co. (1928) 6 N.J. Misc. 463 [141 A. 590] ; Noek v. 
Lloyd (1911) 32 R.I. 313 [79 A. 832, 833].) An invoice sub-
mitted by a third party is not admissible evidence on this 
issue unless it can be admitted under some recognized excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. 1o 
[11] Since plaintiff's expert's testimony as to the rea-
sonableness of the charges was based on hearsay evidence 
inadmissible to prove that the repairs had been made, defend-
lOIt might come in unuer the business recorus exception (Evid. Code, 
§ 1271) if " ... supported by the testimony of a witness qualifie<1 to 
testify as to its identity and the moue of its preparation." (California 
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ant's objections to it should have been sustained. II [A]n 
expert must base his opinion either on facts personally 
observed or on hypotheses that find support in the evidence." 
(George v. llekins Van If Storage Co. (1949) 33 Cal.2d 834, 
844 [205 P.2d 1037]. See also Kastner v. 1,os Angeles Metro-
politan Transit Authority (1965) 63 Cal.2d 52, 58 [45 Cal. 
Rptr. 129. 403 P.2d 385]; Commerrial Union bsur. 00. v. 
Pacific Gas If Electric Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 515, 524 [31 P.2d 
793] ; Behr v. County of Santa Cruz (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 
697,709 L342 P.2d 9871; 2 Jones on Evidence (5th ed. 1958) 
§ 416, pp. 782-783.) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Peters .• J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J., and Peek, J.,. 
concurred. 
McComb, j., dissented. 
